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Imagine you are the advertising executive at a dairy production 
company who just spent $30 million on a new advertising campaign,1 
a campaign that includes both print and digital media advertisements.2 
You created your campaign to market your additive-free cheese, and 
                                                 
*J.D. candidate, Certificate in Intellectual Property Law, May 2019, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.S. in Agricultural and 
Consumer Economics, Concentration in Public Policy and Law, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, May 2016. My utmost thanks to Professor Mickie A. 
Piatt for her invaluable guidance on this topic.   
1 Elaine Watson, Arla Foods defends ‘Live unprocessed’ campaign as rBST 
maker sues over allegedly ‘blatantly and egregiously false’ claims, 
FOODNAVIGATOR-USA, https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2017/06/06/Arla 
-Foods-urges-court-to-toss-rBST-lawsuit-over-Live-Unprocessed-ads (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2018).  
2 Alexandra Jardine Kids Imagine What Food Additives in Adorable 
Animations for Arla, ADAGE, https://adage.com/creativity/work/arla-rbst/51592 (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2018).  
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you incorporated into the advertisements what children think of food 
additives.3 Advertising critics have called the campaign “adorable” 
and have said that it “communicates [your] message clearly,” precisely 
your goal.4 However, the manufacturer of the artificial food additive 
you proudly proclaim is absent from your food is not pleased. The 
food-additive manufacturer sues you, and before reaching the merits of 
your case, a federal judge stops from using your “adorable” 
advertisements that you invested millions of dollars in.5 Exactly one 
year later, a panel of federal appeals judges upholds this decision.6 
How will you recover? 
Unfortunately, this is reality for one company. The Seventh 
Circuit recently upheld a preliminary injunction in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Arla Foods, Inc., a Lanham Act false advertising case.7 The plaintiff, 
Elanco, a subsidiary of Eli Lilly, is the sole producer of the hormone 
recombinant bovine somatotropin (“rbST”), the food additive 
discussed above, which it sells under the registered trademark 
Posilac®.8 The defendant, Arla Foods, a Danish dairy conglomerate, 
started an advertising campaign titled “Live Unprocessed™” by which 
it advertised its cheeses made from rbST-free milk.9 Elanco took issue, 
among other things, with the way in which Arla was portraying rbST 
and subsequently filed a false advertising suit under 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(B), or § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.10 The district court 
                                                 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Elaine Watson, Judge orders Arla Foods to halt Live unprocessed’ campaign: 
‘Ads create false impression that rbST is something foreign and dangerous,’ 
FOODNAVIGATOR-USA, https://www.foodnavigator-
usa.com/Article/2017/06/15/Judge-orders-Arla-Foods-to-halt-Live-unprocessed-
campaign# (last visited Oct. 3, 2018); see Jardine, supra note 2.  
6 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375 (2018).  
7 Id. at 384. 
8 Id. at 379.  
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
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granted Elanco’s motion for a preliminary injunction,11 and Arla 
appealed.12 
The Lanham Act explicitly provides injunctive relief as a remedy 
in trademark and unfair competition actions.13 Courts have the power 
to restrict the content of advertisements that are allegedly false or 
misleading.14 For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff 
“must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 
the public interest.”15  
While considered an equitable remedy, there is room to view the 
preliminary injunction through an economic lens. Judge Richard 
Posner, with inspiration from Professor John Leubsdorf, proposed an 
alternative method of determining when a court should grant a 
preliminary injunction.16 Judge Posner’s preliminary injunction 
standard does not rid the court of the traditional preliminary injunction 
factors; instead, it offers a way for courts to better understand the 
                                                 
11 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *10 
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017). 
12 Arla also argued that Elanco had not made a proper showing of causation. 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 383 (2018). The Seventh Circuit 
upheld the district court’s decision on this issue. Id. at 384. Further, Arla also argued 
that the injunction was “vague and overbroad” and that it did “not meet various 
formal requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)].” Id. at 381. The 
court affirmed the district court with respect to these arguments. Id. at 385. 
13 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (West 2018) (“The several courts vested with 
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall has the power to grant 
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court 
may deem reasonable . . . to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of 
section 1125 of this title.”). This portion of the Lanham Act is also referred to as § 
43.  
14 See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION §30:30 (5th ed. 2018).   
15 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citing Munaf 
v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 
542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)).  
16 See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
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relationship between the factors, leading to more economically 
efficient outcomes for both parties.17 As noted by Judge Posner, a 
district court judge’s job is to “minimize the costs” of mistakenly 
granting or denying preliminary injunctive relief.18 This is especially 
important in false advertising and unfair competition cases, where 
advertisers and media personnel need to make strategic decisions so as 
to avoid litigation. To minimize these costs, the Seventh Circuit should 
reverse its prior precedent in Lanham Act cases at the preliminary 
injunction stage. First, it should no longer presume the plaintiff has 
suffered irreparable harm. Second, the Seventh Circuit should require 
Lanham Act plaintiffs to show proof of actual consumer confusion or 
deception at the preliminary injunction stage. 
This Comment includes three parts. Part I provides a broad 
overview of the preliminary injunction standards as applied across the 
circuits. Further, it provides an analysis of Judge Posner and Professor 
John Leubsdorf’s economic model, which can be used as a vessel 
toward economically efficient outcomes. Part II will provide an 
analysis of the Eastern District of Wisconsin and Seventh Circuit 
decisions in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc. Finally, Part III will 
provide commentary on Eli Lilly, arguing that Seventh Circuit 
precedent may be inhibiting economically efficient outcomes at the 










                                                 
17 Id. “[The formula] is not offered as a new legal standard; it is intended not to 
force analysis into a quantitative straitjacket but to assist analysis by presenting 
succinctly the factors that the court must consider in making its decision and by 
articulating the relationship among the factors.”) (emphasis added).  
18 Id.  
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A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard 
 
1. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
 
The Supreme Court has said that a preliminary injunction is an 
“extraordinary remedy” that is “never awarded as of right.”19 In an 
effort to create unity among the circuits, the Court announced factors 
courts should apply: “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction 
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 
that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction 
is in the public interest.”20 In Winter, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council filed suit under numerous environmental acts, seeking to 
enjoin the United States Navy from using “‘mid-frequency active’” 
sonar because the waves from that sonar allegedly injured marine 
mammals.21 The Navy was testing the sonar off the coast of Southern 
California, where various species of dolphins, whales, and other 
marine mammals reside.22  
The district court granted the Natural Resources Defense 
Council’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.23 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that, contrary to 
Ninth Circuit law, which only requires a possibility of irreparable 
injury, “[o]ur frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking 
preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the 
                                                 
19 Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (“In each case, courts ‘must balance the competing 
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or 
withholding of the requested relief.’”) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of 
Gambell, Ala., 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)).  
20 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008); 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Ala., 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)). 
21 Winter, 555 U.S. at 13-14.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 17.  
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absence of an injunction.”24 The Court found the preliminary 
injunction burdened the Navy by restricting its ability to train with 
mid-frequency action sonar.25 Moreover, the preliminary injunction 
had an adverse impact on the “public interest in national defense.”26  
Winter had a direct impact on the preliminary injunction standard 
as it was applied in the Ninth Circuit. Thus, although the Court was 
applying its “frequently reiterated standard,” more than one circuit 
interpreted the factor language differently.27 It is puzzling, then that 
circuits are still using different language post-Winter, despite the 
binding Court precedent.  
 
2. Overview of Preliminary Injunction Standards Used by the 
United States Courts of Appeals28 
 
In theory, Winter made clear the standard federal courts should 
apply when a plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction.29 Yet, there 
is still confusion and uncertainty amongst litigants; “[e]ach circuit has 
developed its own test for deciding whether or not to grant preliminary 
injunctive relief.”30 Commentators have pointed to these 
inconsistencies for some time. For example, Professor John Leubsdorf 
noted the “dizzying diversity of formulations,” and he argued that 
                                                 
24 Id. at 22 (“We agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’ 
standard is too lenient.”) (emphasis in original).  
25 Id. at 24.  
26 Id. 
27 Id. 22. 
28 While not discussed in the Comment, the Federal Circuit “defer[s] to the law 
of the regional circuit when addressing substantive legal issues over which [it] [does] 
not have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.” Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok 
Int’l, Ltd., 988 F.2d 985, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying preliminary injunction 
standard from the Tenth Circuit).  
29 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008); 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)). 
30 3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §14.02(3)(b)(0i) 
(2018).  
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courts do not provide “any explanation for choosing one [standard] 
instead of another.”31  
Moreover, U.S. Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow has gone even 
further, arguing that even though the courts use a common set of 
factors, the courts apply the factors differently: “[w]hile courts may 
disagree on a uniform standard, possibly due to varying degrees of risk 
and urgency of the injunction, most courts have agreed on the 
underlying factors that govern the decision whether to grant or deny 
a preliminary injunction. It is the discord in applying those factors that 
generates an unclear standard.”32 It is one thing to say a standard is 
uniform; it is another thing to say the same standard is applied 
uniformly.  
Most of the circuits apply some variation of the Winter factors, 
including the First,33 Third,34 Fourth,35 Fifth,36 Sixth,37 Eighth,38 
                                                 
31 John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91. HARV. L. 
REV. 525, 526 (1978). 
32 United States Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow, The Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 
508 (2003). 
33 See Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci. Advancements, Inc., 794 F.3d 
168, 171 (1st Cir. 2015) (“To grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must 
find the following four elements satisfied: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, 
(2) a likelihood of irreparable harm absent interim relief, (3) a balance of equities in 
the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) service of the public interest.”) (citing Voice of the Arab 
World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing 
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).  
34 See Groupe SEB U.S., Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 197 
(3d Cir. 2014) (“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he 
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 
injunction is in the public interest.”’) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).  
35 See Metro. Reg’l Infor. Sys. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 
591, 595 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Parties seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate 
that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer 
irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tips in their favor, and (4) the 
injunction is in the public interest.”) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 
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Ninth,39 Tenth,40 Eleventh,41 and D.C. Circuits.42 These circuits use 
language similar to, if not identical to, language used by the Winter 
                                                                                                                   
36 See Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (Plaintiff 
moving for a preliminary injunction must show “‘(1) a substantial likelihood that 
plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer 
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to 
plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to the defendant, and 
(4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.’”) 
(quoting Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
37 See Southern Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 
860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Four factors guide the decision to grant a 
preliminary injunction: ‘(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on 
the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm absent the 
injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and 
(4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction.”) 
(quoting Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2012)).  
38 See Coyne’s & Co. Inc. v. Enesco, LLC, 553 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 
2009) (“Whether a preliminary injunction should issue turns upon: (1) the 
probability of the movant succeeding on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm 
to the movant; (3) the balance between this harm and the injury in granting the 
injunction will conflict on the non-movant; and (4) the public interest.”) (citing 
Dataphase Sys. Inc., v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).  
39 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 
1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips 
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”’) (quoting Winter v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).  
40 See Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 723 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Four factors must 
be shown by the movant to obtain a preliminary injunction: (1) the movant ‘is 
substantially likely to success on the merits; (2) [[the movant]] will suffer irreparable 
injury if the injunction is denied; (3) [[the movant’s]] threatened injury outweighs 
the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction 
would not be adverse to the public interest.’”) (quoting Beltronics USA, Inc. v. 
Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009)).  
41 See Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1307-308 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“‘[[A]] district court may grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant 
establishes the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the 
underlying case, (2) the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction, (3) the harm suffered by the movant in the absence of an injunction 
would exceed the harm suffered by the opposing party if the injunction issued, and 
8
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Court. This is important, as there appears to be a trend by some 
circuits to embrace the Winter decision. There are some differences in 
the language used43 as well as other nuances particular to each 
circuit.44 The confusion across the circuits arises not only because of 
the varying language, but because of inconsistent application of the 
preliminary injunction factors.45 All courts should employ and use the 
factors in the exact same way because the Court announced the factors 
in Winter. 
The Second Circuit’s view, while clearly incorporating the factors 
from Winter, is a more complex, involved standard when compared to 
the traditional four-factor standards discussed above. In order for a 
court in the Second Circuit to grant a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the plaintiff must establish “(a) irreparable harm and (b) 
either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation 
                                                                                                                   
(4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest.’”) (quoting N. Am. Med. 
Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2008)).  
42 See Archdiocese of Wash. V. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d 
314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“‘The moving party musts make a ‘clear showing that 
four factors, taken together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its 
favor, and accord with the public interest.’”) (quoting League of Women Voters v. 
Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).  
43 For example, as to the likelihood of success factor, the Fifth Circuit requires 
a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” see Paulsson Geophysical Servs. 
Inc. v. Axel M. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008), while the Sixth Circuit 
looks to whether the moving party has a “strong likelihood of success on the merits,” 
see Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n, 
110 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1997). 
44 This is not a Comment about preliminary injunctions, nor will it provide an 
in-depth analysis on the varying standards used by the circuits. See McCarthy, supra 
note 14, at § 30:32 for a more nuanced analysis of these standards in the context of 
Lanham Act cases. 
45 See Denlow, supra note 32, at 508. 
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and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the moving party 
requesting the preliminary relief.”46 
Like the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has described the 
standard in different ways. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Abbot 
Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co. described the preliminary 
injunction standard using the following language: 
 
As a threshold matter, a party seeking a preliminary 
injunction must demonstrate (1) some likelihood of 
succeeding on the merits, and (2) that it has “no adequate 
remedy at law” and will suffer “irreparable harm” if 
preliminary relief is denied. If the moving party cannot 
establish either of these prerequisites, a court's inquiry is 
over, and the injunction must be denied. If, however, the 
moving party clears both thresholds, the court must then 
consider: (3) the irreparable harm the non-moving party will 
suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing that harm 
against the irreparable harm to the moving party if relief is 
denied; and (4) the public interest, meaning the consequences 
of granting or denying the injunction to non-parties.47 
 
 The Seventh Circuit referred to this as a “‘sliding scale 
approach’: the more likely the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the 
less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side; the 
less likely it is the plaintiff will succeed, the more the balance need 
weigh towards its side.”48 Moreover, one reading this standard is likely 
to interpret it as a two-step approach; if the moving party does not 
                                                 
46 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 
206, 215 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 
660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011)).   
47 971 F.2d 6, 11-12 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Lawson Prods. V. Avnet, Inc., 782 
F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 
380, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1984)).  
48 Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 12 (citing Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS, 
Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1393 (7th Cir. 1992); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 
749 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1984)).  
10
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meet the first two “threshold” requirements, the inquiry will end, a test 
contrary to Winter.49 The Winter Court made no reference to a two-
step or threshold style approach. The Seventh Circuit phrased its 
preliminary injunction standard in simpler terms in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Arla Foods, Inc.: 
 
To win a preliminary injunction, the moving party must 
establish that (1) without preliminary relief, it will suffer 
irreparable harm before final resolution of its claims; (2) legal 
remedies are inadequate; and (3) its claim has some 
likelihood of success on the merits. If the moving party 
makes this showing, the court balances the harms to the 
moving party, other parties, and the public.50   
 
The preliminary injunction standard should be described and 
applied uniformly as set out by the Court in Winter and not in the 
apparent threshold way the Seventh Circuit describes it. The Court 
tried to clarify the standard in Winter, but the circuits, especially the 
Seventh Circuit, still have internal inconsistencies. Also, the Seventh 
Circuit only requires “some” likelihood of success on the merits.51 The 
Seventh Circuit has further defined this threshold as a “greater than 
negligible chance of winning.”52 This intra-circuit inconsistency is 
troublesome and there does not appear to be a reason why the Seventh 
Circuit uses different language for the same standard, especially in 
light of Winter.  
Regardless of the way the factors are phrased, specific Seventh 
Circuit Lanham Act precedent prevents district courts from making all 
the necessary considerations under that Act. This begs the question as 
to whether there is a more effective way to evaluate the merits of a 
case when the plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction, while still 
                                                 
49 Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 11. 
50 893 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 
F.3d 317, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2015)).  
51 Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 11.  
52 AM Gen. Corp. v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002).  
11
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considering the traditional factors, especially in false advertising cases. 
The Court’s preliminary injunction jurisprudence sheds an important 
light on the troublesome nature of the Seventh Circuit’s Lanham Act 
precedent.  
 
3. The Economic View 
 
Judge Richard Posner has been at the forefront of incorporating 
economic principles into legal analysis,53 especially due to his 
extensive writing on the subject.54 Thus, it is not surprising that Judge 
Posner created his own economic model by which a court could 
evaluate a case at the preliminary injunction stage.55 While Judge 
Posner presented the economic theory, the analysis has roots in a law 
review article authored by Professor John Leubsdorf of Rutgers Law 
School.  
Professor Leubsdorf argued that “preliminary injunction standards 
should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused 
by errors incident to hasty decision.”56 He stressed that the analysis 
should focus on the respective parties’ loss of rights should the court 
issue an injunction.57 Thus, Professor Leubsdorf proposed the 
following economic view of preliminary injunctions to guide courts to 
                                                 
53 See Michael J. Perry, What is ‘Morality’ Anyway?, 45 VILL. L. REV. 69, 70 
(2000) (referring to Judge Posner as a “founding father of ‘law and economics’”); 
Daniel J. Morrisey, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 21 (2013) (referring to Judge 
Posner as the “founder of Law and Economics”).  
54 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9TH ED. 2014); 
WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).  
55 See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
56 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541 (emphasis added). 
57 Id. (“If [a court] does not grant prompt relief, the plaintiff may suffer a loss 
of his lawful rights that no later remedy can restore. But if the court does not grant 
immediate relief, the defendant may sustain precisely the same loss of his rights.”) 
12
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the decision that “inflict[s] the smallest probable irreparable loss of 
rights:”58 
 
The court, in theory, should assess the probable irreparable 
loss of rights an injunction would cause by multiplying the 
probability that the defendant will prevail by the amount of 
the irreparable loss that the defendant would suffer if 
enjoined from exercising what turns out to be his legal 
right. It should then make a similar calculation of the 
probable irreparable loss of rights to the plaintiff from 
denying the injunction. Whichever course promises the 
smaller probable loss should be adopted.59 
 
Importantly, Professor Leubsdorf stressed that his model 
“provides a coherent analysis” for deciding when to issue a 
preliminary injunction, and that “[t]he model goes beyond the current 
approach by specifying the relationship between [irreparable injury, 
probability of success, and the balance of convenience] and the goal of 
minimizing unavoidable legal injuries.”60  
Judge Posner was certainly influenced by Professor Leubsdorf’s 
viewpoint on the economic rationale of minimizing losses associated 
with granting and denying motions for preliminary injunctions. Judge 
Posner adopted the view created by Professor Leubsdorf in one of his 
Seventh Circuit opinions.61 There, Judge Posner offered the following 
formula: “grant the preliminary injunction if but only if P x Hp > (1-P) 
x Hd.”62 This means that a district court would grant an injunction: 
 
Only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied 
[Hp], multiplied by the probability that the denial would be in 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 542.  
60 Id. at 544.  
61 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 
1986).  
62 Id.   
13
Trunk: “Traditional Principles of Equity?” How Seventh Circuit False Adv
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018




error (that the plaintiff, in other words, will win at trial) [P], 
exceeds the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted 
[Hd], multiplied by the probability that granting the 
injunction would be an error [1-P].63 
 
Contrary to some critics,64 Judge Posner’s view “is intended not to 
force the analysis into a quantitative straightjacket but to assist by 
presenting succinctly the factors that the court must consider in 
making its decision and by articulating the relationship among the 
factors.”65 Further, “[t]he formula is new; the analysis it capsulizes is 
standard.”66 While the viewpoints of Professor Leubsdorf and Judge 
Posner are unique and understandably not widely-adopted, they shed 
an important light on the qualitative economic impact that a 
preliminary injunction may have on a Lanham Act litigant in the 




                                                 
63 Id. In simpler terms, “[t]he left side of the formula is simply the probability 
of an erroneous denial weighted by the cost of denial to the plaintiff, and the right 
side simply the probability of an erroneous grant weighted by the cost of grant to the 
defendant.” Id.  
64 Id. at 610 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, the majority’s formula 
invites members of the Bar to dust of their calculators and dress their arguments in 
quantitative clothing.”). 
65 Id. at 593.  
66 Id. at 594 (emphasis added). It should be noted that Judge Posner himself 
never fully articulated and incorporated the formula in his analysis in American 
Hospital Supply Corp. To the contrary, he used the variables as part of the analysis. 
The formula does not and would not assume the role of the preliminary injunction 
factors. Judge Swygert is therefore correct that “the majority never attempts to assign 
a numerical value to the variables of its own formula.” Id. at 610 (Swygert, J., 
dissenting). The “value” of each variable depends on the unique facts of each case. 
See id. at 596-99 (“We conclude that there was a threat of irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff; and although the dollar amount of that harm is not known with any 
precision and we hesitate to call it great, it seems substantial.”) (“The district judge 
was persuaded that Hospital Products, not American Hospital Supply had broken the 
contract, thus implying a very high P.”).  
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The plaintiff in this case, Eli Lilly and Company and its 
subsidiary Elanco (“Elanco”) sell rbST, the genetically engineered 
version of the naturally occurring bovine somatotropin (“bST”) 
hormone, under the brand name Posilac®.67 Posilac® is the only 
FDA-approved artificial bST hormone.68 bST is “a naturally occurring 
hormone in the pituitary glands of cattle which funnels nutrients 
toward the production of milk.” 69 rbST “has been designed to prolong 
the lactation period of dairy cows and increase milk production.”70 
Elanco has the exclusive right to sell rbST to dairy farmers and 
producers, who administer the hormone to their cows, collect milk, 
and sell it to manufacturers who make dairy products found on the 
shelves of grocery stores across the country.71 
The defendant, Arla Foods, Inc. (“Arla”), is a Danish dairy 
conglomerate owned by at least twelve-thousand farmers across seven 
countries.72 Arla manufactures and markets its cheese and cream 
cheese in the United States at various stores, including Costco, Sam’s 
Club, and Kroger.73 Arla began a new advertising campaign in the 
United States on April 25, 2017 titled “Live Unprocessed.™”74 This 
advertising campaign “feature[d] a television buy across more than 20 
national cable networks, advertisements in print and digital media, in-
                                                 
67 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017). 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. at *2.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
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store advertising, social media outreach, promotional videos, and a 
website.”75  
Part of Arla’s business model involves food safety and milk 
composition.76 Thus, it was not surprising the company asked children 
to explain what they thought rbST was.77 In one of Arla’s thirty-second 
commercials,78 a seven-year-old girl described rbST as a “large six-
eyed monster” with “razor sharp teeth and is so tall it can eat 
clouds.”79 Moreover, this rbST monster has electric fur.80 A narrator 
then makes the following statement: “‘Actually rbST is an artificial 
growth hormone given to some cows, but not the cows that make Arla 
cheese. No added hormones. No weird stuff.’”81 Notably, the 
following message appeared toward the end of the commercial: 
“‘Made with milk from cows not treated with r[[b]]ST. No significant 
difference has been shown between milk derived from r[[b]]ST-treated 
cows.’”82 This commercial appeared on Arla’s Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram, and YouTube pages, and at the time it was running, 
consumers could have seen the advertisement on the Food Network, 
the Hallmark Channel, and Bravo, among other channels.83 
Elanco sued Arla Foods, alleging, among other things, that Arla 
violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) because Arla made “false or 
misleading descriptions of fact” in its commercial, a key part of Arla’s 
“Live Unprocessed™ campaign.84 Shortly thereafter, Elanco moved 
for a preliminary injunction and asked the court to “order corrective 
                                                 
75 Id.  
76 Id. (“Arla asserts that its business model is based in part on ‘Arlagården®,’ a 
farm quality assurance program with four cornerstones: 1) milk composition, 2) food 
safety, 3) animal welfare, and 4) environmental considerations.”). 
77 Id. 
78 See Jardine, supra note 2 to view the advertisement. 
79 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *2.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at *3.  
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advertising to address more than a month’s worth of false 
advertising.”85 
 
B. False and Deceptive Statements 
 
1. The Law  
 
The Lanham Act prohibits a party from making a “false or 
misleading description of fact” or a “false or misleading representation 
of fact”86 which “in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities . . . of another 
person’s goods.”87 To prevail on a false or deceptive advertising claim 
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit must 
show that: “(1) the defendant made a false statement of material fact in 
a commercial advertisement; (2) the false statement actually deceived 
or had the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; 
and (3) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the 
false statement.”88  
These false or misleading statements are typically part of one of 
the following categories: “(1) commercial claims that are literally false 
as a factual matter; or (2) claims that may be literally true or 
ambiguous, but which implicitly convey a false impression, are 
misleading in context, or likely to deceive consumers.”89 
 
When the statement in question is actually false, the plaintiff 
need not show that the statement either actually deceived 
customers or was likely to do so. In contrast, when the 
statement is literally true or ambiguous, the plaintiff must 
                                                 
85 Id.  
86 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (West 2018).  
87 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (West 2018).  
88 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 381-82 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(citing Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999)).  
89 Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  
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prove that the statement is misleading in context by 
demonstrated actual consumer confusion.90 
 
Literally false statements are “bold-faced, egregious, undeniable, 
[and] over the top.”91 Hence, no evidence of consumer confusion is 
necessary.92 On the other hand, proof of consumer confusion is 
necessary for true but misleading statements; at trial, plaintiffs 
typically present the court with consumer surveys.93 However, when a 
defendant is making true but misleading statements in an 
advertisement, plaintiffs need not produce consumer surveys 
potentially showing actual confusion at the preliminary injunction 
stage.94 This rule is advantageous to plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit.  
 
C. District Court Decision 
 
Elanco moved for a preliminary injunction, arguing that Arla, 
through its “Live Unprocessed™” campaign, made false or misleading 
statements about rbST and its brand-name drug Posilac®.95 The 
district court applied the “sliding-scale” standard in considering 
whether to grant the preliminary injunction, akin to that in Abbott.96 
                                                 
90 Id.  
91 Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 
500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009).  
92 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382 (citing Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. 
Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009)).  
93 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.  
94 Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 15 (“The fact that Abbot 
did not conduct any full-blown consumer surveys to prove actual consumer 
confusion does not help Mead, for such proofs are not required the preliminary 
injunction stage.”) (citing Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l, Inc. 814 F.2d 346, 349 
(7th Cir. 1987); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th 
Cir. 1986)).  
95 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017). 
96 Id. at *5 (“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show 
that it has ‘(1) no adequate remedy at law and it will suffer irreparable harm if a 
preliminary injunction is denied and (2) some likelihood of success on the merits.’”) 
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First, the district court had to make a finding as to whether rbST was 
actually safe for humans before it could decide whether preliminary 
injunctive relief was appropriate because “[if] milk from rbST-treated 
cows is less safe than milk from non-rbST-treated cows, it would not 
necessarily be false or misleading to imply this in fact . . . in a 
television commercial.”97 The district court answered this question 
with relative ease, as the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) has on multiple occasions determined that there is no harmful 
impact on human health when milk from cows given rbST is 
consumed by humans.98 
With the safety issue resolved, the district court went on to 
evaluate the case using the preliminary injunction factors. First, the 
court found that Elanco had shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits because Arla made “misleading misrepresentations of fact” in 
its commercial.99 The court noted that “[w]hen the entire commercial 
is watched in context, it first creates the false impression that rbST is 
something foreign and dangerous, and then repeatedly emphasizes the 
notice that consumers should buy Arla cheese precisely because it 
                                                                                                                   
(quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir 2011) (“If this 
showing is made, ‘the court weighs the competing harms to the parties if an 
injunction is granted or denied and also considers the public interest.’”) (quoting 
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013)).   
97 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *6.  
98 See Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk Products from 
Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombitrant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 6279-04, 6279-80 (Feb. 10, 1994) (finding “that milk from rbST-treated cows 
is safe for human consumption”). This finding was confirmed by the FDA in 2016. 
See Bernadette M. Dunham, D.V.M., Ph.D., Citizen Petition Denial Response from 
FDA CDER to the Cancer Prevention Coalition et al, 16 (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0119-0007, (rejecting 
petition to suspend Posilac or require placing a warning label on dairy products 
manufactured with milk from cows given Posilac because “the drug is safe and 
effective for its intended uses and there is no significant difference between milk 
from cows treated with [rbST] and untreated cows.”). The district court also 
considered expert opinions from both Arla and Elanco but found that “there is no 
quantifiable difference between milk from cows treated with rbST and those that 
have not been treated with rbST.” Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *8. 
99 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *9.  
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comes from cows untreated with rbST and does not contain any ‘weird 
stuff.’”100 
The court only briefly analyzed the remaining preliminary 
injunction factors. As to irreparable harm, the Seventh Circuit noted 
and applied the presumption of irreparable harm in Lanham Act 
cases.101 Although Arla’s commercial never mentioned Posilac®, 
“Elanco is the only FDA-approved producer of rbST, thus, a 
reputational attack on rbST is necessarily a reputational attack on 
Posilac®.”102 Moreover, Elanco produced evidence that one cheese 
producer decided to stop buying milk from cows given the rbST 
hormone,103 and that the public interest favored weighing an 
injunction, given the stance of the FDA.104 Finally, even though Arla 
claimed it would lose $6.5 million in media commitments and $9.9 
million to create new advertisements, the court found that balance of 
the hardships tipped in Elanco’s favor.105 Consequently, the court 
issued the preliminary injunction, restricting the content of Arla’s 
advertisements.106 
                                                 
100 Id. at *9. The court rejected Arla’s position that the claims it made in the 
commercial were “puffery” and therefore not in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. See McCarthy, supra note 14, at § 27:38 (“Puffing can consist of grossly 
exaggerated advertising claims such as blustering and boasting which no reasonable 
buyer would believe was true.”); see also Clorox Co. P.R. v. Procter & Gamble 
Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding “vague, unspecified 
boasting” statements in promotional advertising to be puffery).  
101 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *10 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson 
& Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992)).  
102 Id. at *10. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. (“While continued scientific research as to the safety of rbST certainly 
benefits the public, fear-mongering does not.”).  
105 Id.  
106 Id. The court required Elanco to pay a security bond worth $500,000. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). Per the court’s order, Arla was prohibited from any of the 
following: 1. Disseminating the advertisements attached to the plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint (ECF No. 10), and any other advertisement substantially similar thereto; 
2. Claiming, either directly or by implication, in any advertising, website, social 
media, or any other type of public communication that: (a) rbST or Posilac®, or 
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D. Seventh Circuit Decision  
 
Arla’s main argument on appeal was that Elanco had failed to 
produce enough evidence showing it had a likelihood of success on the 
merits of its § 43(a) claim.107 Since Arla made no literally false 
statements in its advertisement, the Seventh Circuit did not address the 
arguments on that category of statements.108 The court thus analyzed 
whether Arla had made true but misleading statements in its 
commercial.109 To do this, the court looked at the evidence presented 
by Elanco: (1) the advertisement itself; (2) opinions of the FDA 
regarding the safety of rbST; and (3) the evidence that one cheese 
producer stopped buying rbST milk.110 The court looked at this 
evidence but actually relied on the law in the Seventh Circuit; 
consumer surveys “are not required at the preliminary injunction 
stage.”111 
As to the content of the advertisement itself, the Seventh Circuit 
agreed with the district court: “[t]he ad draws a clear contrast between 
Arla cheese (high quality, nutritious) and cheese made from rbST-
                                                                                                                   
dairy products made from milk of cows supplemented with rbST or Posilac®, are 
dangerous or unsafe; (b) dairy products made from milk of cows supplemented 
with rbST or Posilac®> are of lesser quality or less wholesome than, or 
substantially compositionally different from, other dairy products; (c) rbST or 
Posilac® is an ingredient added to some dairy products or milk; (d) rbST or 
Posilac® is “weird” and/or dairy products made from milk of cows supplemented 
with rbST or Posilac® contain “weird stuff”; and (e) consumers should not feel 
“good about eating” or “serving to [their] friends and family” dairy products made 
from milk of cows supplemented with rbST or Posilac®. Id. at *11. 
107 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 2018). The 
Seventh Circuit reviews the district court’s decision to issue an injunction for abuse 
of discretion. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 2005).  
108 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.  
109 Id. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 15 (7th Cir. 
1992)).  
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treated cows (impure, unwholesome).”112 The court found that Arla’s 
statements were misleading in part because of the monster depiction 
and the “[n]o weird stuff” language.113 It appears the court wanted to 
make some connection to consumers, but this was its only means of 
making such a connection. The Seventh Circuit also agreed that the 
science behind the safety of rbST milk was well-settled.114  
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that Elanco had shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits in part because of the evidence that 
one cheese producer stopped using milk from cows treated with 
rbST.115 The court noted this was not evidence of actual consumer 
confusion, but found that the cheese producer has an “economic 
incentive to accurately predict consumer demand.”116 After taking all 
the evidence under consideration, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the 
district court that Elanco had shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits, or a “greater than negligible chance,”117 of its Lanham Act 
claim.118 
  
ARGUMENT AND COMMENTARY 
 
The Seventh Circuit reached the right conclusion in Eli Lilly & 
Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc. given the state of the court’s precedent in 
Lanham Act cases. Nevertheless, if the court reversed this precedent, it 
might reach different outcomes in false advertising cases in the future. 
The Seventh Circuit should adopt the preliminary injunction factors 
                                                 
112 Id. at 383.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. The court noted that Arla included the FDA-recommended disclaimer in 
the advertisement. However, it found that the disclaimer did resolve the fact that 
parts of the advertisement were misleading.  
115 Id.  
116 Id. (“[The cheese producer’s] concern about the ad campaign’s impact on 
consumers supports the judge’s conclusion that the ads convey a misleading message 
about rbST.”). 
117 AM Gen. Corp. v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
118 Id.  
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from Winter. Also, it should incorporate the considerations expressed 
above by Professor John Leubsdorf and Judge Richard Posner; it need 
not rely on mathematical formulae. Their approach was not meant to 
assume the role of the factors. To make more economically-informed 
decisions at the preliminary injunction stage and in an effort to 
minimize losses among the parties from the granting or denial of a 
motion for preliminary injunction, the Seventh Circuit should no 
longer presume irreparable harm in Lanham Act cases. Furthermore, it 
should require proof of actual consumer confusion or deception at the 
preliminary injunction stage. 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Presume  
 Irreparable Harm in Lanham Act Cases 
 
1. The Seventh Circuit 
 
The Seventh Circuit recognizes a presumption of irreparable harm 
in Lanham Act cases.119 Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co. 
was a false advertising case between two competing oral electrolyte 
maintenance solution (“OES”) producers.120 Mead, the manufacturer 
of the Ricelyte OES solution, started an advertising campaign 
“designed to convince physicians and nurses to recommend Ricelyte 
over Pedialyte,” Abbot’s product.121 Mead stated the carbohydrates in 
its products came from rice, while the carbohydrates in Abbott’s 
product were from glucose.122 However, Mead’s campaign “[played] 
up Ricelyte’s association with rice” by “[forging] a direct link between 
Ricelyte and rice” and “at times directly [stating] that Ricelyte’s link 
                                                 
119 Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 18 (7th Cir. 1992). 
120 Id. at 9 (“Oral electrolyte maintenance solutions are over-the-counter 
medical products used to prevent dehydration in infants suffering from acute 
diarrhea or vomiting.”). 
121 Id. at 10.  
122 Id.  
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to rice makes it superior to Pedialyte.”123 As a result, Abbott filed suit 
under § 43(a)(2) of the Lanham Act and sought injunctive relief.124 
The court went on to address the preliminary injunction factors. 
Notably, the court struggled with the preliminary injunction standard: 
“[d]espite our recent efforts to clarify the law of preliminary 
injunctions . . . confusion persists, as demonstrated by the contrasting 
spins both parties place upon the four-part preliminary injunction 
standard.”125 While the court analyzed the other factors, of notable 
importance was its analysis on the presumption of irreparable harm. 
Irreparable harm is often presumed in Lanham Act cases because 
intangible harms, “such as damage to reputation and loss of goodwill,” 
are hard to calculate.126  
The district court found that the presumption of irreparable harm 
had been rebutted in this case in part because, without Ricelyte on the 
market, Pedialyte had a monopoly.127 Further, the district court 
reasoned that “Abbott’s reputational damage will have no tangible 
economic impact because Pedialyte will have regained its monopoly, 
leaving those who need OES products with no other choice.”128 The 
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding because the 
district court did not “address the possibility of ordering [other] 
intermediate forms of relief after a full trial on the merits.”129 Despite 
its lengthy analysis of the presumption in the context of the facts of 
this case, the court still found the presumption to be “well-
                                                 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 11. Like Eli Lilly, Abbot sought “modifications in Mead’s advertising 
and promotional materials.” Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 16.  
127 Id. at 16 (“Any injunction, entered after a full trial, would remove Ricelyte 
from the market, thereby restoring Pedialyte’s monopoly and lost market share.”).  
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 17-18. The Seventh Circuit found the district court failed to consider 
other forms of relief, including “an order prohibiting Mead from purveying the false 
‘rice claims’ and directing it to issue corrective advertisements and brochures.” Id. at 
17 (“These less severe remedies would leave Ricelyte a viable, albeit somewhat 
discredited, competitor with at least part of its current market share.”).  
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established,” that it applies “absent a showing of business loss,” and 
was “in this case unchallenged.”130 Thus, the presumption of 
irreparable harm has and continues to be the law of the Seventh 
Circuit. 
 
2. Shifting Away from the Presumption:  
 eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
 
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.  involved patent law, another area 
of intellectual property law. eBay is the owner of a website where 
sellers can list and sell their goods.131 MercExchange holds “a 
business method patent for an electronic market designed to facilitate 
the sale of goods between private individuals by establishing a central 
authority to promote trust among participants.”132 After failed attempts 
to license its patent to eBay, MercExchange sued eBay, alleging patent 
infringement.133 A jury returned a verdict for MercExchange, finding 
that its patent was valid and infringed by eBay.134 The jury awarded 
money damages.135 
MercExchange moved for a permanent injunction; the district 
court denied this motion.136 The Federal Circuit disagreed with the 
district court’s decision, citing that circuit’s “general rule that courts 
will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent 
exceptional circumstances.”137 Specifically, the Federal Circuit stated 
“that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity 
have been adjudged.”138 The Supreme Court, in its pre-Winter 
                                                 
130 Id. at 18.  
131 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).  
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 390-91. 
135 Id. at 391.  
136 Id.  
137 Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).  
138 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-394 (quoting MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338).  
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decision, began its analysis by reciting the four-factor test district 
courts use in determining whether to grant a permanent injunction.139  
The Court noted that injunctive relief is available under the patent 
laws.140 The Court ultimately vacated the decision below, finding that 
“neither court below correctly applied the traditional four-factor 
framework that governs the award of injunctive relief.”141 The Court 
found that the Federal Circuit’s rule was a “categorical rule” that 
“cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by 
Congress.”142 In criticizing both the district court and the Federal 
Circuit, the Supreme Court clearly stressed the importance of equity 
and rejected the application of general rules in the decision to grant 
injunctive relief.143 
 
3. Post-eBay: The Third Circuit 
 
The Seventh Circuit can rid itself of the presumption of 
irreparable harm by following the reasoning and holding of the Third 
Circuit in Ferring Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 
                                                 
139 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“According to well-established principles of equity, 
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a 
court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”) 
(citations omitted). Note the minor differences in this standard compared to that used 
by district courts when hearing motions for preliminary injunctions.  
140 Id. at 392 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283) (West 2018) (“The several courts having 
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the 
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such 
terms as the court deems reasonable.”) (emphasis added).  
141 eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.  
142 Id. at 393. 
143 Id. at 394. (“We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny 
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that 
such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in 
patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.”) (emphasis 
added).  
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Inc. In Ferring, the Third Circuit held that “a party seeking a 
preliminary injunction in a Lanham Act case is not entitled to a 
presumption of irreparable harm but rather is required to demonstrate 
that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not 
granted.”144 An analysis of the facts and reasoning of Ferring will 
show that the court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the facts of Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc. 
Ferring and Watson, two pharmaceutical companies, produce rival 
prescription progesterone products.145 Women produce progesterone, 
“a hormone that plays a key role in helping women become pregnant 
and maintain their pregnancies,” naturally.146 Women who pursue 
assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) often need progesterone 
supplementation.147 Ferring manufactures Endometrin; Watson 
manufactures Crinone.148 
Ferring filed a Lanham Act suit under § 43(a) and moved for a 
preliminary injunction, arguing that Watson made false and misleading 
statements about Endometrin at a presentation by a consultant Watson 
hired to present to doctors and other healthcare professionals at two 
presentations.149 Watson hired this consultant to give presentations on 
its progesterone supplement, Crinone.150 Ferring alleged that its § 
43(a) claim arose out of three statements made by the consultant: “(1) 
                                                 
144 Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 
2014). The Ferring court is not the only court to get rid of the presumption of 
irreparable harm in Lanham Act cases. See Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t 
Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that, in light of eBay, 
plaintiffs moving for a preliminary injunction in trademark infringement cases must 
show irreparable harm). The presumption has also been overruled in the copyright 
context as well. See Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 
998 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that presuming irreparable harm in a copyright 
infringement case is inconsistent with, and disapproved by, the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in eBay and Winter.”).  
145 Ferring, 765 F.3d at 206.  
146 Id. at 207.  
147 Id. One example of ART is in vitro fertilization. Id. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 207, 209.  
150 Id. at 207.  
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he referenced a ‘Black Box’ warning on Endometrin’s package insert; 
(2) he discussed a patient preference survey comparing Crinone and 
Endometrin; and (3) he mischaracterized the results of certain studies 
of Endometrin’s effectiveness in women over the age of thirty-five.”151  
Ferring moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court 
denied this motion, finding that “Ferring was not entitled to a 
presumption of irreparable harm in seeking a preliminary 
injunction.”152 The district court then looked at the evidence available 
to it at the preliminary injunction stage, and the district court found 
that there was not enough evidence of irreparable injury to justify 
granting a preliminary injunction.153 Ferring appealed, arguing that the 
presumption should apply to Lanham Act cases in the Third Circuit.154 
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that it “has never 
held that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction pursuant to a 
Lanham Act false advertising claim is entitled to a presumption of 
irreparable harm.”155 The Third Circuit ultimately decided that there 
was no presumption of irreparable harm when a plaintiff moves for a 
preliminary injunction in false advertising cases filed under the 
Lanham Act.156 Two Supreme Court decisions helped the court reach 
this conclusion: Winter and eBay. The Ferring court relied on Winter, 
where the Court found that “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based 
solely on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our 
                                                 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 209.  
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 210.  
155 Id. at 210-11 (“The justification for applying this presumption, therefore, is 
twofold: (1) a misleading or false comparison to a specific competing product 
necessarily causes that product harm by diminishing its value in the mind of the 
consumer, similar to trademark infringement cases; and (2) the harm necessarily 
caused to reputation and goodwill is irreparable because it is virtually impossible to 
quantify in terms of monetary damages.”).  
156 Id. at 216 (“Because a presumption of irreparable harm deviates from the 
traditional principles of equity, which require a movant to demonstrate irreparable 
harm, we hold that there is no presumption of irreparable harm afforded to parties 
seeking injunctive relief in Lanham Act cases.”). 
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characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that 
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
to such relief.”157  
It is hard to reconcile the Court’s decision with the Seventh 
Circuit’s continued reliance on the presumption of irreparable harm in 
Lanham Act cases. If a possibility of irreparable harm was no longer 
possible after Winter, it stands to reason that a blanket “general rule” 
presuming irreparable harm should certainly not be possible either.  
Further, the Ferring court considered the eBay decision, a case 
where the Court found that lower courts cannot adopt categorical rules 
and should consider “traditional principles of equity” in deciding 
whether or not to grant a motion for injunctive relief.158 Even though 
eBay involved patents, the Court’s “rationale is easily applicable . . . in 
cases arising under the Lanham Act.”159 First, the court compared the 
language of the relevant injunction sections of both the Lanham Act 
and the Patent Act; both require courts to consider principles of equity 
when deciding to grant the relief.160 Second, the Third Circuit noted 
that the eBay Court explicitly stated that its holding was applicable to 
areas of law outside of patent law.161  
The majority in eBay also stressed, and the Third Circuit 
recognized, that “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive 
                                                 
157 Id. at 213; Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) 
(emphasis added).  
158 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
159 Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
160 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (West 2018) (“The courts vested with 
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant 
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court 
may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right . . . or to prevent a 
violation under subsection (a) . . . of section 1125 of this title.”); 35 U.S.C. § 283 
(West 2018) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation 
of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).  
161 Ferring, 765 F.3d at 215-216 (“In addition . . . we believe the logic of eBay 
is not limited to patent cases but rather is widely applicable to various different types 
of cases.”).  
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relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and 
that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 
principles of equity.”162 Taking all of this into consideration, including 
the Court’s binding preliminary injunction jurisprudence, the Ferring 
court found that there was no presumption of irreparable harm in 
Lanham Act cases.163 
 
4. Impact on Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc.  
 
The Court in eBay rejected categorical, general rules applied by 
lower courts in deciding to issue preliminary injunctions and held that 
district courts should use “traditional principles of equity” in deciding 
motions for injunctive relief.164 Shortly after that decision, the Winter 
court explicitly rejected a more lenient interpretation of the 
preliminary injunction factors, stating that this more lenient standard 
“is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an 
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing 
that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”165  
In the words of the Ferring court, “[p]resuming irreparable harm 
would relieve the plaintiff of her burden to make such a [clear] 
showing.”166 Thus, unless the Seventh Circuit reverses its prior 
precedent and requires a Lanham Act plaintiff to meet her burden and 
show irreparable harm, it will not be able to accurately consider the 
“irreparable loss of rights to the plaintiff from denying the injunction,”  
thereby raising questions of whether the court effectively minimized 
the potential costs of making the wrong decision.167 
                                                 
162 Id. at 215 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 394).  
163 Ferring, 765 F.3d at 217. The court also analyzed the facts of the case 
without the presumption, but still found that “the District Court did not clearly err in 
finding that Ferring dialed to demonstrate that it would likely suffer irreparable harm 
in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. at 219.  
164 eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.  
165 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing 
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)).  
166 Ferring, 765 F.3d at 217.  
167 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 542.  
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The Eli Lilly district court recognized the presumption of 
irreparable harm.168 Despite applying the presumption, the court found 
that Elanco would “continue to suffer unquantifiable reputational and 
financial damage for the length of [Arla’s advertising] campaign.”169 
Even though Arla never mentioned Eli Lilly, Elanco, or Posliac® in 
the advertisements themselves, “Elanco is the only FDA-approved 
producer of rbST in the United States, thus, a reputational attack on 
rbST is necessarily a reputational attack on Posliac®.”170  
Moreover, the district court emphasized that a single cheese 
producer no longer sourced milk from cows that were given rbST, 
partly because of the way the Arla portrayed the rbST hormone in its 
advertisements.171 Thus, despite the presumption, the district court 
found that Elanco had suffered irreparable harm.172 Notably, the 
Seventh Circuit did not even address the irreparable harm factor in its 
opinion, focusing its analysis solely on the likelihood of success on the 
merits factor. 
It is possible that the presumption of irreparable harm hurt Arla in 
this case, thus, according to Judge Posner, increasing the value of Hd, 
the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted.173 The 
presumption almost certainly gives plaintiffs an edge and weakens 
their burden when moving for a preliminary injunction. There appears 
to be an apparent dichotomy in that, in order to “win a preliminary 
injunction, [the plaintiff] must establish . . . it will suffer irreparable 
harm [without preliminary relief] before final resolution of its claims,” 
but this burden disappears in Lanham Act cases.174  
                                                 
168 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., 2017 WL 4570547, at *10 (E.D. Wis. 
June 15, 2017) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 
1992)).  
169 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *10. (emphasis added).  
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 Id.  
173 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 
1986).  
174 Id. (emphasis added). 
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It is hard to tell if, given the record before it, the Seventh Circuit 
would have reached the same decision even without the presumption 
of irreparable harm. According to the court, the harm is easily 
traceable to Elanco given the fact that it is the sole producer of the 
FDA-approved rbST hormone Posliac®. This point certainly weighs in 
Elanco’s favor. The fact that one cheese producer stopped purchasing 
of milk from cows given rbST is also telling. But the mere fact that 
Elanco is the only FDA-approved manufacturer of rbST should not 
carry the day. It is possible consumers do not even know that fact, nor 
would they know it, after seeing the advertisement. 
Without the injunction, there is a strong argument that more dairy-
product producers would also stop purchasing rbST milk out of fear 
that consumers themselves would be turned away by the hormone and 
no longer purchase dairy products made with milk from cows given 
rbST. But the question remains whether, given this one piece of 
evidence, Elanco suffered harm that was in fact irreparable. If there is 
little to no irreparable harm but the injunction is still granted, the value 
of (1-P), “the probability that granting the injunction would be an 
error,” also increases.175 Thus, the district court judge might be making 
the wrong decision. 
This erroneous decision making is exactly the problem Judge 
Posner and Professor Leubsdorf set out to resolve.176 Without actually 
showing what irreparable harm, if any, a plaintiff like Elanco suffered, 
it is possible a district court judge would mistakenly make the wrong 
decision in granting a preliminary injunction.177 Mistakenly granting a 
preliminary injunction can be especially costly for a defendant like 
                                                 
175 Id. As Judge Posner puts it, another way to thinks about “P” is that it is the 
probability the “plaintiff . . . will win at trial.” Id.  
176 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541 (“preliminary injunction standards 
should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors 
incident to hasty decision.”) (emphasis added).  
177 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 593 (“A district judge is asked to 
decide whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction must choose the course of 
action that will minimize the costs of being mistaken. Because he is forced to act on 
an incomplete record, the danger of a mistake is substantial. And a mistake can be 
costly.”).  
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Arla, who already spent upwards of $30 million dollars on its 
advertising campaign.178 Further, Arla likely lost $6.5 million in media 
commitments and would need to spend $9.9 million to create new 
advertisements.179  
If this injunction was mistakenly granted, “the judge commits a 
mistake whose gravity is measured by the irreparable harm, if any, that 
the injunction causes the defendant while it is in effect.”180 Therefore, 
the Seventh Circuit should no longer presume irreparable harm in false 
advertising cases. Without the presumption, the district courts can 
make an efficient inquiry into the facts of each case. 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Should Require Proof Of Actual Consumer  
 Confusion or Deception at the Preliminary Injunction Stage 
 
The Seventh Circuit should reverse prior precedent and require 
plaintiffs who make false advertising claims under the Lanham Act 
and move for preliminary injunctions to present evidence of actual 
consumer confusion or deception. For some statements, this type of 
evidence is not necessary. But for other statements, whether or not 
plaintiffs must show evidence of actual consumer confusion or 
deception depends on what stage the litigation is in. For literally false 
statements, the plaintiff need not ever show evidence of consumer 
confusion because “[a] literally false statement will necessarily 
deceive consumers.”181 On the other hand, when a defendant makes 
literally true but misleading statements about a plaintiff’s product, the 
plaintiff need only present such evidence of consumer confusion or 
                                                 
178 See Watson, supra note 1.  
179 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at 
*10 (E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017).  
180 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 593.  
181 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(citing Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 
500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009)).  
33
Trunk: “Traditional Principles of Equity?” How Seventh Circuit False Adv
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018




deception at trial.182 Most plaintiffs obtain this information from 
responses to consumer surveys.183 
However, plaintiffs who move for a preliminary injunction need 
not present proof of actual consumer confusion.184 The Seventh Circuit 
has justified this rule in part because “[i]t is not feasible to require a 
Lanham Act plaintiff to conduct full-blown consumer surveys in the 
truncated timeframe between filing suit and seeking a preliminary 
injunction.”185 Again, this broad categorical rule is inhibiting the 
district courts from thoroughly analyzing the unique facts of each false 
advertising case that comes before them. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, 
Inc. is one such case. The Court in eBay made clear that the decision 
to issue a preliminary injunction should conform to the “traditional 
principles of equity” and not according to broad rules.186 If a Lanham 
Act plaintiff must show evidence of consumer confusion at trial, she 
too should have to show the same evidence at the preliminary 
injunction stage in order to show that she has a likelihood of success 
on the merits, an arguably low standard in the Seventh Circuit.187 
Courts have said that “[t]he purpose of the false-advertising 
provisions of the Lanham Act is to protect sellers from having their 
consumers lured away from them by deceptive ads.”188 The court 
should then want to have feedback from consumers at any stage of 
                                                 
182 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 375.  
183 Id. 
184 Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 15 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“The fact that [Plaintiff] did not conduct any full-blown consumer surveys to prove 
actual consumer confusion does not help [Defendant], for such proofs are not 
required at the preliminary injunction stage.”) (citing Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam 
Int’l, Inc. 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, 
Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1986)).  
185 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.  
186 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
187 The Seventh Circuit requires “some” likelihood of success, Abbott, 971 
F.2d at 11, which is a “greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM Gen. Corp. v. 
Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). 
188 Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 
500, 512 (7th Cir. 2009).  
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litigation, because the consumers are the ones who are important. If 
they are not deceived or mislead by the statements made in the 
advertisements, and this evidence was shown at trial, a plaintiff would 
likely lose, as their claims would have no merit.  
If the consumers would have the same opinion at the preliminary 
injunction stage, there is no way a plaintiff could show a likelihood of 
success on the merits, thereby rendering her unable to meet her 
burden. This in turn reinforces the point of the economic view that 
“preliminary injunction standards should aim to minimize the probable 
irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty 
decision.”189  
A review of the facts of Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc. 
reinforces this point. Arla’s commercial was narrated by a seven-year-
old.190 The commercial featured an animated monster with “razor 
sharp teeth” that is “so tall it can eat clouds.”191 Moreover, the monster 
is depicted as having electric fur.192 Additionally, Arla included the 
required FDA disclosure at the end of its advertisement.193 Both the 
district court194 and the Seventh Circuit195 noted that, since Arla’s 
statements were true but misleading, Elanco did not have to show 
evidence of actual consumer confusion or deception since Elanco was 
moving for a preliminary injunction. If the rule were otherwise, there 
is a strong argument that no reasonable consumer would be misled by 
the juvenile and comical way in which Arla depicted rbST.  
The district court noted Arla’s argument that “the fantastical 
elements make clear to a reasonable cheese consumer that he should 
not take any of the statements about rbST seriously.”196 This argument 
                                                 
189 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541.  
190 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *2 
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017). 
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 383 (7th Cir. 2018).  
194 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *9.  
195 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.  
196 Id.  
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goes precisely to the point of why the court should require evidence of 
actual consumer confusion or deception at the preliminary injunction 
stage. If this evidence is the key to succeed at trial, it should be 
required at the preliminary injunction stage as a way to show a 
likelihood of success on the merits.  
The Seventh Circuit concluded that “[c]onsumer surveys were 
unnecessary” because “rbST-derived dairy products are no different 
than other dairy products . . . the ads themselves, the FDA’s regulatory 
guidance, and the evidence of decreased demand” all show that Elanco 
would succeed at trial.197 The court did not consider any consumer 
feedback. There remains the possibility that consumers would have 
watched Arla’s ads, not taken them seriously, and continued to buy 
whatever cheese products they purchased prior to seeing a thirty-
second, animated commercial where they are told that the FDA finds 
no difference in milk from cows given the rbST hormone and milk 
from those that are not given the hormone. The evidence cited by the 
Seventh Circuit appears to only reach a “possibility” of success on the 
merits threshold, a threshold that was explicitly rejected by the Court 
in Winter.198  
The Seventh Circuit justified the rule in part because of the 
“truncated timeframe between filing a lawsuit and seeking a 
preliminary injunction.”199 But its these unsubstantiated “hasty” 
decisions and the resulting errors which Professor Leubsdorf warned 
against.200 Further, “[a] district judge is asked to decide whether to 
grant or deny a preliminary injunction must choose the course of 
action that will minimize the costs of being mistaken.”201 It is 
impossible to even remotely calculate “the probability that [denying 
the preliminary injunction] would be in error,” thus hurting the 
                                                 
197 Id. at 383.  
198 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“We 
agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.”) 
(emphasis in original).  
199 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382. 
200 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541. 
201 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 
1986).  
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defendant, without any evidence of what consumers think of the 
advertisements.202  
The Seventh Circuit’s broad rule whereby a plaintiff need not 
show evidence of actual consumer confusion or deception at the 
preliminary injunction stage is preventing it from even considering the 
economic consequences of its decision. If the consumer’s feedback is 
important at trial, it should be important at other stages of litigation as 
well. The consumers should have their voices heard, as they are the 




Despite binding Court precedent, courts still apply various 
versions of the preliminary injunction factors, particularly in the 
Seventh Circuit. Scholars proposed a supplementary approach, 
whereby a court could consider the economic impact of the decision to 
grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief. Those defending Lanham 
Act false advertising claims in the Seventh Circuit have an even 
steeper hill to climb. Seventh Circuit precedent makes it easier for 
plaintiffs in these cases to get injunctions issued in their favor. This 
precedent prevents the court from taking into consideration the 
economic impact of these decisions, thereby increasing the chances 
that the court erroneously issues preliminary injunctions.  
                                                 
202 Id.  
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